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There are several philosophical issues which are usually woven
around the notion of actions. Apart from the dominant question as
to how actions (as contrasted with involuntary happenings) are
different from, and related with, cognition, wish and willóa question
which boils down to the controversy whether actions are caused by
these mental antecedents or justified (rationalized) atemporallyóthere
arises the further dispute about which of the ontological categories
like particulars, universals, events, substance, etc., will be suitable to
house them. From the standpoint of philosophy of language, issues
like analysis of the logical form and semantics of action-words and
action-sentences demand special attention. A typically semantic
problem regarding the difference between reference and
description comes up with regard to actions, for the same action
seems to be available to several descriptions. To take an instance
cited by Davidson, the same action of flipping the switch may
alternatively be described as ëdriving off a batí, ëchecking the degree
of luminanceí, ëchecking the functionality of the power pointí,
ëilluminating the roomí, ëdisturbing air moleculesí, ëalerting a
prowlerí, etc. The strong suggestion that it is the very same action
that is intentional under some of these descriptions and
unintentional under other ones stirs up some prevalent philosophical
anxietiesóthose regarding the extensional  identity of the action,
the ontology of its attributes and their mutual relationówith a fresh
resurgence.
In this paper, I seek to bring out the difference between the
later Wittgensteinís1 and Davidsonís view of actions with a special
focus. This will be an attempt to compare and contrast their
respective approaches to the correlative notions of wish, will
(intention) and actions, an issue which has customarily been
categorized as ëreasoní-approach of Wittgenstein as against the
ëmental causationí theory endorsed by Davidson. I have sought to
integrate this theme with the semantic issue of the distinction
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between reference and description or that between the
extensionalist and intensionalist approach to actions. While in the
two broad sections of this paper we deal with Davidsonís theory and
the Wittgensteinian critique respectively, we have concluded with
a brief indication of McDowellís treatment of this cause/reason
polemics  phrased in terms of the non-conceptualist versus
conceptualist debateósuggesting a new direction to engage with
Wittgensteinís insights on action.
DAVIDSONíS THEORY OF ACTION: A BRIEF EXPOSITION
From the richly detailed corpus of Davidsonís writing on actions2, I
focus on certain specific topicsóhis mental causation view of actions,
his notion of agency, and his treatment of will or intention. This will
also acquaint us with the exact nuances of his treatment of this
distinction between reference and description (or that between
extension and intension) and see how it recurs across the different
aspects of his theory.
Davidsonís Causal Theory of Action
To say that a person performs an action is also to say that he does it
for a reason, and in so far as this reason causes his actions it becomes
the primary reason. For Davidson R is a primary reason why an agent
performed the action A under the description d when it satisfies
two conditions: (1) R has to consist of a pro-attitude (desires, wants,
urges, aesthetic principles, social conventions) of the agent towards
the action with a certain property, and a belief (knowing, perceiving,
remembering, etc.) of the agent that A under the description d
has the relevant property. (2) This pair of belief and desire has to
cause the action. (Let us call this couple of statements C1).3 Stated
more cryptically this would run as: ëFor an event e to be an
intentional action under a description d, it must be caused by
something which was a reason for doing e under dí. (We may term
this as C2) Let e be the event of the agentís hands moving over the
switch in a way that the latter is pressed down, and let this event be
an intentional action under description d (viz. ëdriving off a batí)ó
here the agent must have the required pro-attitude towards the
general species of actions having the relevant property (viz. the
property of driving away a bat) and also the belief that this particular
action falls under that species.  Further, as one may have the primary
reason and yet refrain from doing the action, Davidson, in order to
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bridge the gap between the primary reason for an action and the
action itself, has to bring in the additional requirement of the former
as also causing the latter.
This mental causation theory of action is to be appreciated against
the rationalist or justificatory account.4 According to the latter,
actions to be actions must be intelligible or describable in terms of
their reason. Reason amounts to their identification, ruling out the
possibility that the reason be posed as preceding and thus being
separate from the action itself.  As the cause of an action will
necessarily antecede and, thus, be separate from the action itself,
reasons are not causes. Thus this rationalist account alleges the causal-
theorist as making a false split between the action and its primary
reason, in so far as he projects the latter as its cause. The crux of
Davidsonís defence against this position is roughly as follows. Wanting
to do an action x is multiply satisfiable, and hence, cannot logically
incorporate the precise way it is to be carried out, nor can it cover
the innumerable contingencies that stand in the way of its
implementation. As the notions of wanting to do x and doing x are
logically independent, the conceptual identity claimed by the
reason-theory does not hold ground, and the logical gap has to be
closed only by actual causation. Davidson will further argue that
one can adopt the simple verbal trick of bridging this gap by turning
the causal statement into the following analytic statement: ëThe
pro-attitude and the beliefs which are the causes of doing x in all
possible worlds are the causes of doing x.í The artificial triviality of
such exercises becomes apparentóin what for Davidson is the
obvious factóthat we can very well identify our belief and desire
for x without doing x itself.5
However, in Essay 4 ëFreedom to Actí6 Davidson himself works
out an inadequacy of C2, and goes on to build his causal theory on
stronger grounds. He hits upon innovative examples that betray C2
as merely necessary and not sufficient for explaining the notion of
an intentional action. He describes the situation of two
mountaineers hanging on a rope in a precarious position where
the action of loosening the rope by the first mountaineer will save
his own life at the cost of the second. Here the event e is the fingers
loosening on the rope, the description d is ëgetting rid of the weightí
that is supposed to turn the mentioned event into an intentional
action A, and the agent, viz. the first mountaineer evidently has the
required pro-attitude and belief about the relevant property of the
action, which causes the actual event of loosening the grip and the
fatal fall of the second mountaineer. Yet we cannot say that the first
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mountaineer committed the action of intentionally loosening the
rope to let his friend fall.  Here Davidson points out that the primary
reason of the action is not the reason but a reason, for the causal
chain leading to the fall does not follow a straightforward track.
The agentís pro-attitude and belief about the desirable property
(of getting rid of the weight) is overpowered by the unnerving fear
that his desire may supersede the professional norms and
commitment to his friend, and finally it is this fear which actually
precipitates the action. Such recalcitrant instances lead Davidson
to add that the causation should be in ëthe right wayí and finally to
incorporate the richer notion of intention to supplement his initial
formulation.  In the real course of life our pro-attitudes are often
intractably entwined with and constantly overpowered by our con-
attitudes which lead Davidson to observe: ëWhat I despair of spelling
out is the way that attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalise
actions.í7
Agency and the Distinction between Extension and Intension
One of Davidsonís stock example of floating this tension between
reference and description with respect to actions is that of flipping
a switch, which though extensionally the same as or numerically
identical with actions as driving off a bat, checking the degree of
luminance, checking the functionality of the power point, lighting
the room, disturbing air molecules, alerting a prowler etc., not all
these descriptions will render the action intentional. Davidson claims
that while the criterion of agency is in the semantic sense intentional
or conceptual, the expression of agency is extensional or referential.8
That is to say, the agent comes into  a ëdirectí, or rather what
Davidson will call, a ësemantically transparent contactí with  actual
features of the event, whether he actually represents them or not
in the course of his action. On the other hand, for a third person to
decide whether the agent has acted intentionally or not, the factor
whether he (the agent) knows the real features of the event (which
would include the features of the objects involved in the action as
well as its consequences) is indispensable. Thus while the person
flipping the switch expresses his agency with respect to all his
knowable and unknowable consequences, while firing a gun by an
agent connects his agency with the unintentional killing of another
person, the criteria for describing and interpreting the action,
whether in the first person or the third person are semantically
opaque, they fall back on the crucial factor whether that particular
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description of the event pertains to the agentís representation and
intention.
Davidson further explores whether the notion of agency can be
explained in terms of a person   bringing about or causing an event
in a primitive way, or to put it slightly otherwise, in terms of causing
a primitive action. Interestingly Davidson does not design the notion
of primitive action against those that are non-primitive. Opposing
Arthur Dantoís view Davidson claims that there are no basic or
primitive actions that are commonly shared amongst all actions of
different levels of complexity, nor can this primitive/non-primitive
distinction be drawn with respect to specific actions relative to
specific contexts. For Davidson, primitive actions can neither be
defined as being immediately caused by brain-events or muscle-
contractions, nor can they be cashed out in terms of causing
secondary phases or consequences of the action. The agent might
be ignorant about the physiological details, but the latter do not
cause his actions, rather in doing the action the agent also causes
them to obtain. Further Davidson asserts that when I do any action
A by doing B (disturb air molecules by flipping the switch; kill the
archbishop by checking out the trigger), actions A and B are
numerically or extensionally same. It is the same action that can,
like an accordion, be squeezed or stretched out in terms of its
different aspects and consequences, like the same action of flipping
the switch can be squeezed into the bare movements of the arms
and fingers or stretched out to absorb its variant offshoots. So once
the rift between primitive actions and the consequences are flattened
out, we have to digest that the primitive actions are all the actions
there are, for the customary notion of the so-called non-primitive
actions as being mental or rather more conceptual and cerebral,
accommodating various descriptions vis a vis the primordial non-
descriptional character of the primitive actions can no longer persist.
Being primitive and non-primitive are the two ways in which an
action is described.9
Though Davidson deliberately seeks to impress this notion of
extensional agency as simpler and more basic than that of intention
(and intension) he is careful to note that this extensional identity
of the action itself cannot be made ready for receiving alternative
descriptions (i.e., descriptions pertaining to the conceivable
intentions and possible consequences) unless it is clothed in a
minimal descriptional load of a primary intention. Indeed how can
the self-same action of oneís moving oneís legs in structured intervals
in the forward direction, or the minimal act of flipping the switch
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with oneís arms, be identified except under the intention of making
perambulatory movements or an intentional manipulation of the
switch? In the absence of an intention (i.e. in cases where my body
was forced to move in a walk-like movement by some invisible
pressure, or my fingers ran over the switch involuntarily) the
accordion effect is not applicable. So what makes a primitive action
an intentional one, with respect to some consequences at least, needs
to be answered.
Davidson on Intending
Apart from the demand that we have just noted, there are other
reasons for which the notion of intention demands a special place
in Davidsonís scheme of actions. Davidson certainly does not want
his theory of action to glide into some form of behaviourism either
of Wittgensteinian or the Rylean variety. He wants his intention to
figure as mental foundations of actionsóand also with the further
demand that they ground our actions as their causal antecedents
and not as their rational basis, primarily because actions according
to him are events that happen in time. At the same time he does
not want to posit his intentions as pure acts of will working
mysteriously in a non-deterministic model of causation as is
conceived in traditional Dualism.10
Most vitally, Davidson is concerned with the notion of pure
intending that may occur without practical reasoning, action or
consequence. He also seems to admit this pure intending as being
a detachable identity shared commonly with performed actionsó
the latter having a certain degree of deliberation and successful
execution as an add-on feature.11 Davidson is quite sensitive to the
fact that most intentions are not formed, if forming an intention
involves conscious deliberation and decision. Davidson thinks that
the notion of intention that we need as the explanatory basis of
action has to be ëbroader and more neutralí, it does not have the
imposing character of a plunge, and yet despite its slow, subdued
and gradual emergence it is an event, it is an action in so far as it is
something that the agent does.
Further, the theory of mental causation of action, even in his
revised formulation phrased in terms of primary reasons causing
the action ëin the right wayí (discussed earlier in this paper) fails to
break free of a nagging circularity.12 Obviously what Davidson implies
is that the revised account falls into a dilemma: Either it fails to
close the gap between primary reasons and the intended action or
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closes it only at the cost of inserting the notion of intentional action
into the definitionñthe very notion that it sets out to define. Besides,
this account (of primary reason causing the action in the
straightforward or right way) is not adequate to capture the notion
of intention, for the purported action is not familiar or observable
even to the agent himself.13 This leads Davidson to enrich the notion
of primary reason itself into that of intending in a non-circular way
that keeps clear of the notion of action and yet explains the latter.
Davidson goes on to explain the main difficulty in defining the
notion of intention (rather forming an intention) in terms of belief
and desire in the Aristotelian model of practical syllogism. We know
that for Aristotle the format of practical syllogism runs as:
Any action of mine, which has xyz features (e.g. consumption of
sweets), is desirable.
This action of mine has xyz features (is one of taking sweets).
Therefore, this action of taking sweets is desirable.
Aristotle said that the action itself follows as the conclusion of the
syllogism.
Davidson rightly points out that on this account there remains
an unbridgeable gap between the major premises and the
conclusion. On the one hand, the conclusion is an evaluative
judgment expressed in terms of a demonstrative reference to a
particular action; the major premise on the other hand makes a
broad sweep over actions only in so far as they are sweet-consuming,
it does not have the power to address the specificity of each
individual action which in spite of having the general feature of
being sweet-consuming, has variant shades of desirability and
undesirability. It is not till one is acquainted with the particular action
demonstratively referred that he is able even to put up the stance
of subsuming the conclusion under the major premise.
Let us take the liberty of projecting this form of practical
syllogism as fundamentally different from two other types of
theoretical syllogisms. First, in the stock example of theoretical
syllogism like ëAll men are mortal, Ram is a man, and therefore
Ram is mortalí, the particular presented in the subject-term of the
minor premise and the conclusion are possible particulars, not actual
ones. We may add that the referring expressions (proper names,
definite descriptions, pronouns and indexicals) occurring in the
subject-position of the minor premise and conclusion of theoretical
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syllogisms are sometimes put to an attributive use, not a referring
one.14 In a second type of theoretical syllogism however, we can put
Ram as an actual individual (with whom we are actually acquainted)
in the conclusion, and thereby subsume it under the major premise,
in so far as the predication of mortality is not subjected to further
conditions or viewpoints. But the conclusion of the practical reasoning
under consideration, though may be matched with the major
premise as a hind-sight, what remains as the crucial point is  that in
choosing to perform the relevant action I went beyond the scope of
the major premise; ëmy choice represented, or perhaps was, a
judgment that the action itself was desirable.í15 The major premises
of a practical syllogism never have a law-like character; there the
general predicate of desirability is always qualified by a proviso, what
Davidson terms ëprima facieí desirability. All that is warranted by
such premises is the conclusion about the particular action as being
desirable only under that respect. Davidson goes on to assert that
the judgment corresponding to, or perhaps identical with, the action
must be an ëall-out unconditionalí judgment. The full form of this
judgment will run somewhat like this: ëAny action of mine in the
immediate future that has the required xy features (consumption
of sweets) would be desirable, given the rest of what I believe  about
the immediate futureí. As the exclusion of an endless set of
frustrating conditions cannot be incorporated as provisions in the
major premise, what is crucial for the all-out judgment is that of
there being an assumption that nothing will come up to make the
action (of eating sweets) undesirable or impossible. Obviously this
judgment does not incorporate this condition in its own body; rather
this assumption forms the very condition of our intentions. The
intention ëassumes and does not contain a reference to a certain
view of the future.í16 Davidson further claims that it is this special
assumptive nature of the all-out judgment shared in common
between pure intending and enacted intentions that despite the
absence of the demonstrative, forges the required connection
between the homogenized generality of the major premise and
the desirability of the particular and complete action performed by
the agent. Overall, this judgment is also hoped to ensure the
causation of action as obtaining in the non-deviant or ërightí way.
Causation and Causal Explanation of Actions
As we have seen, the principal motivation behind Davidsonís causal
theory of action is the claim that no amount of cognition, however
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certain it is, and no extent of desire, however strong it is, are
adequate to account for the action, unless the all-important inputó
that of the primary reason as causing the actionóis filled in. But
Davidson is careful to note the special characteristics of this mental
causationóits being holistic, normative, intentional and non-
nomological. Let us briefly explain at least some of these features:
Holism: Contrary to the causal relations that obtain between physical
events in an isolated fashion, the causal relations between mental
states and actions are holistic. What seems to be a straightforward
causal operation between a mental state and a plain physical
behaviour actually spills over their purportedly specific boundaries
into a holistic mesh of other beliefs and desires. To go back to our
old example where we attribute the intention of illuminating the
room on the basis of seemingly plain behavioural indication of
turning on the switch, we just need to reshuffle the environment
of the agentís preceding and succeeding behaviour, incorporate
more information about the agentís wants and beliefs, to activate
alternative intentions like alerting the prowler, driving a bat,
checking the switch etc.. Let us engage in a more complex and
imaginative example: Suppose we attribute to somebody the desire
of stealing a painting of Rothko on the basis of what we think to be
plain behavioural indications.17 However, if we take care to place
this behaviour in a more pervasive pattern of his life, the same
behaviour can be read as a move to save the painting from a foreseen
risk of being stolen by another person, or muscular exercises in
relation to the picture, or a play with the shadows of both the picture
and his body, or rearrangement of objects in the museum or
exhibition. Similarly, once we have attributed a desire for stealing,
his subsequent act of not taking it, even if provided with ample
opportunities, does not conclusively warrant the withdrawal of that
previously attributed desire. That desire may have been overpowered
by another desire for preserving an honest reputation, or been
delicately adjusted to an exaggeration of risk-factors, etc.  ëThere is
no assigning beliefs to a person one by one on the basis of his verbal
behaviour, his choices, or other local signs no matter how plain and
evident, for we make sense of particular beliefs only as they cohere
with other beliefs, with preferences, with intentions, hopes, fears,
expectations and the rest.í18
Intension, Causality and Causal Explanation: Davidson rephrases his
special view of mental causation in terms of a distinction he draws
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between events as particulars, i.e.,as referentially transparent entities,
and actions as events described in one way or other. For Davidson the
mental and the physical are two aspects of the same event, a relation
which turns out to be one   of ëtoken-identityí, independent of any
type or property binding the two. Events being neutral bits of reality,
instantiate laws only when described in certain ways and not in
others. Causality and identity obtain between individual events no
matter how they are described. Causal explanation on the other hand
falls back upon laws or at least on the specific descriptions that the
events receive in exclusion of other options. Consider the statement
ëThe explosion on 21 July 1990 in Kolkata caused the collapse of
the Howrah Bridgeí. If that explosion happens to be the loudest
thing on that day then we can safely substitute the phrase ëthe
explosion in ...í with ëthe loudest thing...í without altering the truth-
value of the original statement of causality. Evidently this
Interchangeability Salva Veritate is possible due to the extensional
character of causality and identity, whereas causal explanation
(whether nomological or not) will obviously be referentially opaque,
putting a particular screen of description between our language
and the event. So for Davidson a mental causation does not hold in
the sense of physical causation, for while the latter obtains between
non-descriptional events, the former qua explanation or
rationalization, though non-nomological, relate to  actions only in
so far as they are  described or categorized   in terms  of specific
intentions.19
Mental Causation Being Non-Nomological: We have already noted
that the indeterminate and the intractable way in which an action
meshes up in a web precludes a nomological relation between reason
and action. Overall, Davidson views causation as operating in a more
relaxed manner allowing a spectrum of possible degrees of causal
explanation. Psycho-physical and psychological relations obtain as
generalizations that are distinct from laws. To attribute an agent
(the mountaineer or the Rothko-coveter) a belief and desire in
favour of their action, or another person the desire to crush a snail,
is not to engage in a law-like prediction, for the simple reason that
such beliefs and desires are invaded by a multitude of other
cognitions and emotions. To attribute an agent such beliefs and
desires in favour of an action is to attribute him a mere tendency to
act in a certain way in a contra-factual situation. This analysis relieves
mental causation from the threat of counter-examples and the
burden of nomological prediction while supplying it with the
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required freedom or under-determination that is characteristic of
voluntary actions.
Placing Davidsonís Theory of Action within his Theory of Meaning
We can round off this account with a brief indication of the extent
to which Davidsonís theory of action can be synthesized with his
general theory of meaning. Can the action-sentences of our natural
language be interpreted in the model of deducing T-theorems from
certain extensional axioms and rules of inference of first order
predicate-logic along with the tool of recursive semantics?20
Davidsonís format of T-sentences illustrated in terms of his standard
example of flipping the switch will read as:
ëRajiv flips the switchí if Rajiv flips the switch. (A)
An attempted understanding of the theory of interpretation of
actions as an integral part of his general theory of meaning will
have to focus on the following points:
(a) While events are bare particulars actions as intentionally loaded
events do not form a part of the extensional entities of the world.
Hence one cannot formulate the axioms for a theory of interpreting
actions in terms of ascribing extensions to action-words.
(b) Actions are particulars and their adverbial modifiers are simply
relations that they (actions) pass into and pass out without
compromising their original semantic identity.
The logical form of action-sentences, for instance of ëRajiv flips the
switch cautiouslyí will be:
Ee ((Flips the switch (Rajiv, e)) and (Cautious ( e )) (B) where e is
an individual variable ranging over events.21
From (B) one can deduce both conjuncts separately. However
Davidson is cautious to note that a co-extensive (but not co-intensive)
substitution of the action-phrase in (B) say by the phrase ëDrives off
the batí will not preserve its truth-value. Similar analysis will apply a
fortiori to the adverb ëintentionalí.22
(c) The crucial answer to the question as to how the T-sentences
give interpretations of the action-sentences framed in object-
language, we know that Davidsonís response will come in terms of
holism and indeterminacy. Each T-theorem will be deduced not in
isolation but in a network of other T-theorems. One cannot confront
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a single belief, a singly uttered sentence, or an action performed in
isolation, and then goes on to work out the specific pattern of causal
relation in which it enters with other beliefs. Thus, reference is
achieved in a holistic manner, starting with the full sentences, and
not in the piecemeal fashion of the causal theories of reference.
And as we have seen, in the same circumstances there will be several
non-synonymous sentences in the meta-language, all of which are
different interpretations of the same sentence in object-language.
Both the axioms as well as the statements about beliefs and desires
in this theory are theoretical constructs, on whose basis the theorems
are deduced along with the pre-supposition of a common basis of
rationality. That is to say, our evidence of accepting a particular
truth-condition for an action-sentence must be based on a shared
stock of rational principles that connect belief, desire and action in
a way that is universal for all humankind.23
DAVIDSON AND WITTGENSTEIN: DISTANCE BEYOND PROXIMITY
Davidsonís style of philosophizing shows a temperament that is fairly
sensitive to the overwhelming irregularities and the prodigal variety
of the worldly phenomena, as well as the intractable difficulties of
its detail that make it extremely difficult to put them under
theoretical explanations, to make neat categories of mind and body,
or to draw neat quantitative boundaries between different objects
and events. Yet his highly observant spirit always strives to bring these
anomalies under control, with a steadfast conviction that beyond
this superficial chaos lies the fine-grained world of structured
regularity. While he ensures that the T-sentences are interpreted
in a holistic background of other T-sentences, his universal
prescription of charity is not sensitive to the Wittgensteinian insights
about the inherent indeterminacy of all purported foundations of
languageóbe it inner or outer extension, beliefs or assumptions,
verbal rules or principles. For Wittgenstein, all proposed foundations
of our language are ruptured internally, i.e., even within a specific
holistic network. His way of exploring the anomalous and chaotic
extravaganza is not to recoil into foundations or originary sources,
not to substitute global foundations with local ones, but to dissipate
all supposedly hidden depths to an open expanse of uses and
behaviours, to dissolve all explanations into unfounded actions.
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Working out Wittgensteinís Critique of Davidsonís Mental Causation
Wittgensteinís resistance against the causal theory of action
principally consists in the insight that no state of intention or volition
can be segregated from an action, from which the action can said
to follow as an effect. This needs to be appreciated against the
backdrop of his reflections on the so-called mental concepts in
general. He points out that a study of phenomena like seeing,
hearing, thinking, expecting, hoping, believing, willing etc. invites
a question of criterion, viz. what external behaviours one must exhibit
to be in that state. In the first place, hopes, expectations cannot be
given an insular phenomenological quality of the presentótheir
content spills over to imbibe the precedents and consequents of
the situation (Philosophical Investigations (Henceforth PI) 584).24
Suppose the entire morning I am hoping that N.N. will come and
bring me some moneyóif one minute is cut off from this context
ëwill it not be hope?í The question can be answered sensibly only if
we realize that whether we cut off a chunk of one minute or five
hours from the stretch, hoping cannot preserve a purely mental
status if the words do not belong to the language-game, i.e. if the
ëfeelingí of hope is displaced from the entire institution of money-
lending in which it is situated. Secondly, the diverse cases of hoping,
expecting, intending does not share a common self-identical
character in the shape of a special mental undertone that can be
retrieved through introspection. To dissipate such myths
Wittgenstein takes to his characteristic style of actual survey of cases
where these terms are used (PI  588). (i) I am revoking my decision
to leave tomorrow. (ii) Your arguments do not convince me, I stick
to my previous decision. (iii) Asked how long are you going to stay I
say ëTomorrow my holiday endsí. (iv) At the end of a quarrel I say,
ëOkay I decide to leave tomorrowí. There is no characteristic
experience of ëtending towards somethingí underlying all these
diverse phenomena. Intention to say something does not consist in
opening oneís mouth, drawing oneís breath and letting it out again,
for such things can happen in a completely different situation to
feed a completely different concept. (PI  591) On the whole the
dimension of ëdepthí in the cases of genuine intentions as contrasted
to faked ones consist in a flattening out of this depth in painstaking
descriptions of humdrum uses (PI  594).
It is interesting to note Davidsonís response to similar arguments
raised by Melden against the causal theory of action. Davidson
observes that mental causation of actions does not require either ëa
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stab, a qualm, a prick or a quiver, a mysterious prod of conscience
or act of the willí,25 nor a mental event which is common or peculiar
to a particular kind of action, say the driver raising his arm with the
purpose of signaling.26 For Davidson what is required is a mental
event at some moment before the action, something that the driver
saw before he raised his arm. Besides, Davidson argues that in
complicated actions like driving or swimming it is not a single event
but a sequence of activities that bears the stamp of its mental
causationóë...there are more or less fixed purposes, standards,
desires, and habits that give direction and form to the entire
enterprise, and there is the continuing input of information ...in
terms of which we regulate and adjust our actions.í27 Such responses
show that Davidson is far from appreciating the purported mental
phenomenaólike the sudden visual observation of the driver, or
the standards, purposes, and the style of continuous reception of
inputsóas inextricably entwined with, and not antecedent to, a
rich corpus of behaviours (PI 242-315).
Further, though Davidson admits verbal uses as a kind of action,
he thinks it to be substantially different from the non-verbal ones.
For Wittgenstein on the other hand, they blend into a single
continuum very much in the same way that pain-language becomes
a sophisticated extension of pain-behaviour. When a child hurts
himself and cries out in pain, we teach him new pain-behavioursó
e.g., exclamations like ëoh!í ëouchí, putting his hands on the sore
place; and later, pain-languages like ëstubbing oneís toesí, ëitchingí,
ëtooth-acheí etc. Teaching pain-language is teaching him a new
kind of pain-behaviour, and none of these behaviours (linguistic
and non-linguistic) are labels or signboard-indicators for his internal
and private pain-sensations.  Learning and teaching a new cluster
of pain-behaviours (linguistic and non-linguistic) is not the end of
language game, but rather its beginning. It is the beginning of a
process of forming and expanding the concept of pain along the
transitional links of family-resemblances. Actions for Wittgenstein
are not the consequence of language, nor are passively represented
in the same; rather language in general is an extension of the
consensus of actions, of forms of life, in the same manner as pain-
language in an extension of pain-behaviour.
This vital distinction between the two philosophers naturally casts
a far-reaching impact on various aspects of their views on action,
particularly with respect to will or intention. We have already noted
that both of them dismissed the dualistic assumption of a special
state of will or intention and treated it as an action that may stop
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short of generating further actions as in the case of pure intending.
However, while Wittgenstein stretches out all the separate links of
belief, desire and action into a seamless complex, Davidson uses his
notion of intending as a missing link in his mechanism of explaining
actions. The foundationalist commitments of Davidson convinces
him of a state of intention that lies beneath the riotous flow of
conflicting beliefs and desires, holding the key to all the questions
as to why we act as we act, and why we intend as we intend. Now
how will Wittgenstein respond to Davidsonís operation of tracking
down a subdued assumption of an all-out judgment underlying our
intentions? To put it more precisely, how will Wittgenstein react to
the way Davidson opens up a gap between flat generality of the
major premise of a practical syllogism and the particularity of the
conclusion, only to close it up with the all-out judgment? For
Wittgenstein, once an action-theory creates a gap in this manner, it
refuses to be closed up in the prescribed way. The indeterminacy
of the major premise does not simply consist in its glossing over
several species or aspects of desirability, and thereby failing to capture
the specific aspect of the particular action referred to in the
conclusion. For Wittgenstein, each of these species or aspects will
be internally ruptured precluding an entailment even when the
aspects of desirability are specified in the major premise. For one
thing, the semantic indeterminacy of each of the words with which
the premises and the conclusion are coined, cannot be foreclosed
by rules. For another thing, the proper names or demonstratives in
the minor premise do not cut out an immaculate individualóbe it
an individual man or animal or an event-actionóeither in a
conceptual or a non-conceptual manner. Both individual as well as
conceptual identification are in this sense non-foundational and
reduce to actions. In other words, the major premises of both
theoretical and practical syllogisms, in their predicative content as
well their range of individual variables, flesh out bit by bit, through
each derivation of a conclusion.28
Davidson asserted that the judgment ëthat corresponds to, or is
perhaps identical with the actioní must be an all-out unconditional
judgment. The verbal expression of such a judgment will be ëThis
action is desirable.í29 Here interestingly Davidson is equating
judgment with action, and since he distinguishes the judgment from
its verbal form, we may conclude that for Davidson this judgment is
a mental action. Now Davidsonís way of refuting Dualism by forging
a relation of token-identity between physical and mental events gets
bogged down with a neat scaffolding of definite spatio-temporal
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identities, missing out the significance of their inter-penetration.
In this sense it is doubtful as to what extent Davidson appreciates
that manipulating verbal symbols, or running images sequentially,
or combining them with one anotheróspill out of their supposedly
mental content into indeterminate motley of uses and behaviours.
Similarly what makes an action a typically physical event is not a
neatly detachable space-time eventuality, but the way it overflows
its prescribed boundaries to what is thought to be exclusively mental
- the silent speech, images, feelings etc. All these Wittgensteinian
insights will have their repercussion on the Davidsonian ontology of
intention, challenging its pre-verbal or mental status as well as the
semantic transparency of its verbal clothing, showing them to be
inoperative even within a system.30
Davidson seems to oscillate between two positions on the nature
of intending ñ on the one hand he appreciates that the ëall-out
judgment corresponds to, or perhaps is identical with the actioní,31
while at the same time he characterizes the intentional action and
intending as two concepts which need to be linked by the said
judgment.32 And in this connection his theory of intention may be
frustrated by a substantial drawback. If the intention or the all-out
judgment is identical with the action then it cannot cause the latter.
In that case Davidson has either to abandon his causal theory of
action or has to admit that it is the prima facie judgments that cause
the all-out ones. Evnine points out an interesting problem pertaining
to the possible mechanism of this causation.33 All prima facie
judgments, whether on desirability or undesirability of the action,
even if compared and computed as regards their relative weightage,
will at most generate another prima facie judgment on desirability
and never an all-out judgment. This yawning chasm between the
mental cause and the effected action that persists in Davidsonís
scheme may push it against the intentional character of mental
causation that is so vital to his action-theory. Causation of an action
will lose its essential reference to the representation of the desirable/
undesirable features and aspects of the action by the agent, it will
lapse into a brute relation of mere causality between the unknown
physical correlate of desire and belief on the one hand and physical
movement on the other.
Further, Wittgensteinís critique of will exposes its traditional
notion as a counterpart of the Fregean sense. In the model of sense
catching the reference, the will is conceived as fixing the exact
point on which to catch hold of the action. We may venture to
suggest that Davidsonís   all-out judgment figures somewhat as an
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intermediary sense, with its generality chiseled down to catch hold
of the particular action, even when the latter is absent (as in the
case of pure intending), along with which the required assumption,
viz. that of the absence of all invalidating circumstances is woven in.
Thus it also has an interesting similarity with the Strawsonian
mechanism of referenceówhere the referent is acquired by
presupposing, and not stating its unique existence.34 With Davidsonís
theory, we find that the reference to a particular action under the
required description is achieved by the assumption of its blending
with generality, or rather the assumption of the generality thinning
down to the individual action with the aid of negating the
invalidating circumstances. All theories of meaning or action that
invoke an intermediary to connect words with the world or wish
with the actionóviz. the sense or intention, respectivelyówill fall
into an endless exercise of interpretations of interpretations of
interpretations...in their vain attempt to justify the putative self-
interpretive character of the intermediary. Davidsonís theory of
action too has a strong tendency to lapse into the same pitfall.
We can use a picturesque analogy given by Wittgenstein to show
how the official doctrine of dualism as well as Davidsonís treatment
of will or intention suffers from the same folly. Both look upon
causation in the model of the working of a machine and envisages
the failure of causal nexus of the wish, will and action only in one
way: As they cannot identify an effective mechanism connecting
the parts of the machine, i.e., since they cannot locate the apparatus
through which the wish links up to the will or the will links up to
the action, they declare the failure of the deterministic causal
narrative on that account. For Wittgenstein on the other hand, the
causal narrative of the will fails because the causal nexus fails in
another way, viz. because the machine-parts mesh into each other
or because the cog wheels mesh with what they have to mesh. In
the similar fashion the wish meshes with the will and will with the
action. This is what Wittgenstein states explicitly when he says that
willing, if it is to be distinguished from wishing, cannot stop short of
the action itself. Trying, attempting, making an effort are a plethora
of activities (PI 613-615). While Davidson openly claims that we can
know our wishes and desires independent of our action, for
Wittgenstein it is the certainty of the statement and action that is
the criterion of there being a previous thought (PI 633). Feeling is
not the criterion for determining actions; rather the action, the
space and the objects are the criteria for determining the feeling
(PI 625-626). We do not perceive mechanical motions, we perceive
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what the agents do in terms of their wants and beliefs. Just as we look
at a cat when it stalks bird, or a beast when it wants to escape (PI
647), similarly we see the pedestrian step aside to let a vehicle pass,
we see a child observing a bird climb on a chair to get a better view
of it.
Wittgenstein further argues that the thought or intention of
saying something is like a brief or incomplete note, and action is
like following out that brief note. It is not that there are several
interpretations of that brief note and I choose one line of
interpretation in my action. On a later occasion I just remember
what my action was, I do not remember my choosing one alternative
among others. It is straightforwardly remembering my intention,
what I was going to say. This clearly shows the absurdity of splitting
the intentions and actions (PI 634).
Wittgensteinís observations about intention being like brief
(incomplete) notes or a snapshot with incomplete details (PI 635-
637) can be fruitfully compared with his notion of a rule being like
a ëshort bit of handrailí. As there is nothing beyond the handrail,
and there isnít nothing beyond the handrail,35similarly the incomplete
details of the snapshot-like intention is neither irrelevant nor
relevant. It is not irrelevant in the sense that a crow crowing in the
background of my performing an action is irrelevant; it is not
relevant in the sense that the action was encapsulated in that
snapshot. Using the statement of oneís intention as a way of filling
out the background of an action is a regressive exercise; it is not a
forward movement from the prior causal antecedent to the
subsequent effect. Had Davidsonís all-out judgment not been
invested with a positive (though revisable) content, and had it not
been pulled back one step short of the action, it could have been
treated on par with this notion. Wittgenstein emphasizes that this
incomplete and scanty snapshot cannot by itself account for actions,
nor should one try to design a complete story (in the shape of the
cause or reason), cast it into a neat boundary and make it stop before
the action itself (PI 638). One has to take the entire background
where the wish, opinion, intention and action are blended in an
indissoluble whole. The ontology of action does not involve the
temporal split of causality, or the logical split between wish, will and
action in the model of entailment. This continuum should not be
conceived in a fashion where several thoughts tie up in a chain, for
this will generate further questions whether these ties are separate
thoughts or feelings too, in the same manner as each link invoked
to tie up the word with reality only invokes a further link.36
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Wittgensteinís observations that ëone is unable to show such
connexions, perhaps that comes laterí (PI 639), may be taken as
suggesting a hindsight, provided we do not to let it lapse into the
model of a logical system. Wittgenstein rounds up his discussion on
will with the explicit statement that any proposed foundationóa
verbal statement or a non-verbal intention ñ underdetermines the
action (PI 641).
Action and the Sense/Reference Conundrum: Inter alia Cause-Reason
Polemics
We may initially tune up to Wittgensteinís take on the issue of
reference and description before we can appreciate how the
difference between his and Davidsonís respective approaches to
this matter distanced their views on action. The crux of
Wittgensteinís contention on the issue of reference and description
comes in the shape of his critique of the Augustinian model of
language. The Augustinians think that every wordóproper name,
common noun, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, etc.órefers to a static,
readily available entity, while the function of descriptions or
sentences is simply to combine these references in a variety of
permissible ways. Thinking in this way stands on a par with equating
each lever of a locomotive - the light-switch, crank, door-handle,
brakeówith their external projections jutting out from different
positions and all looking alike (PI 4). For Wittgenstein, the special
character of a referring game consists not in pinning down pre-
descriptional logical atoms, but in putting up a preparatory stance
of a discourse, projecting an object with a non-relational, isolated
and solitary character with an apparently indivisible identity, playing
down its internal complexity and relations with other objects. Putting
pieces on the board before playing any real moves (PI 47), a builder
calling  out the words ìslabí, ëpillarí, ëblockí, ëbeamí and his assistant
bringing the  relevant material (PI 2), a person being trained to
utter different noises in response to different colour-samples (PI p.
187) are cited  as illustrations. On the other hand, tracking down
the levers in their inextricable modes of connection with other parts
of the cabin, delivering actual moves of the game, absorbing the
building blocks in the full-fledged process of construction,
distributing the sound-labels of colour-samples in time and space,
will be the corresponding descriptive games.  With regard to actions
we can surely conceive the following games (in the analogy of
illustrations given above): The trainer calls out ëWalkí/íWalkingí,
110 SHSS 2012
ëLieí/ëLyingí, ëJumpí/ëJumpingí and the learner responds either
by actually performing, or drawing the picture or recalling an image
of the appropriate action, or even uttering specific noises allotted
to different sample-pictures of standard actions. The corresponding
descriptive games will be exercises of recasting actions in terms of
their phases or narrating internal details, taking note of the duration
of a particular action, comparing different actions in terms of their
respective temporal orders, or in terms of their respective
configuration of limbs, and so on.
Wittgenstein points out that the basic flaw in the Augustinian
model consists in conceiving the relation between reference and
description in terms of pre-given chunks and their passive assortment.
Now reference is no doubt a simple preparatory move in contrast to
description. But on a close analysis, these games of putting the pieces
on board, the builderís exercise, or uttering a special noise for a
specific action-sampleóin so far as they have no tendency to move
to the actual steps of playing, or the intricate stages of construction,
or distributing them in space and timeócannot even be called
simpler games in any sense. The simplicity of these so-called simple
moves can only be appreciated in so far as they do not remain as
truncated fragments but are seen as incorporated into the full-
fledged games. And the way the simple is incorporated into the
complex, or reference is incorporated into description is obviously
not through a passive and linear assortment but in a dialectical
interplay of an extremely intractable nature.
With this prelude we can go on to examine how Wittgensteinís
view of reference seeks to purge off all vestiges of foundationó
how it breaks forth all ëismsí in Davidsonís holism, how it de-stabilizes
all agreements underlying Davidsonís indeterminacies, how it would
rupture all identities that either play the role of intra-linguistic
justifiers or extra-linguistic constraints of actions.
Davidsonís notion of the extensional character of a self-same
action vis a vis the intensional mediation of agency and intention
seems to be confusing. Despite of refuting Dantoís basic actions
(posed as counterparts of logical atoms of language) he seems to
be labouring under a faulty assumption of an action being the self-
same referent invested with a uniquely basic or primary intention
prior to secondary ones. Is walking more primary that  making a
linear pattern on the ground, testing the density of the soil at regular
intervals in the forward movement, feeling the heart-beat when
one takes forward steps, preventing oneself from a sequence  of
falling, testing the comfort-quality  oneís shoes, etc. etc.? How can
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Davidson claim that it is one action in terms of a primary intention
while the variance of descriptions only pertains to alternative aspects
or consequences? Sneddor37 also observes that Davidson could only
dissolve the basic/non-basic distinction at the cost of a prior
individuation of actions in terms of primitive and non-primitive. In
the same vein he (Davidson) seems to commit himself to the minimal
semantic fact given to a radical interpreteróthe fact of the alien
interpreter uttering phonemes and/or moving his limbs with the
intention of making these marks and movements go beyond
themselves. It is indeed notable that both Wittgenstein and Davidson
desist from the absurd skepticism of Dualismóthe absurd proposal
that we as  interpreters of othersí actions start with purely mechanical
or robotic movements , to which we adjoin beliefs, desires and other
mental states. But the crucial difference between these two
philosophers begins to emerge as soon as we realize that for
Wittgenstein there cannot be anything like a semantic primitive
posing as the starting point of all alternative descriptions, or rather
as the neat gateway for entering into the holistic mesh of actions,
desires and beliefs. Without this entry-point it makes no sense for
Davidson to situate the agent in a causal network, for the action as
an effect or consequent requires a separate spatio-temporal identity
for itself. This separability is also demanded by the principles of
radical interpretation which claim both the speaker and hearer to
be situated in the same causal and logical network, sharing a common
stock of logical and non-logical beliefs connected through universal
principles. For Wittgenstein, this putative entry-point is already
absorbed into the mesh; there is no neat physical movement of the
interpreter with a clean starting and end-point for the interpreter
to lay his hands on.
For Wittgenstein, the polemics about actions being caused by
antecedent reasons or being atemporally justified, and the further
dispute whether an action has an extensional identity over and above
its intensional aspects, is not so much an ontological issue; it is rather
the difference between two  language-games played with respect
to action-words. First, we need to appreciate that like all other cases,
causal language-games too are sophisticated extensions of our
instinctive behaviours. Wittgenstein mentions some proto-typical
occasions from which our causal expressions take offócollision of
billiard balls, pulling a string (traction), clock-works which combine
both collisions and tractions, human reactions on being hit physically
or emotionally, and lastly, occasions of Humean succession. It is
important to realize that these events do not contain the real essence
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of causation which we passively represent in our cognition, to be
further expressible in language and to be followed up by suitable
actions. On the contrary all these expressions like ëcollisioní, ëimpactí,
generation, ëaction and reactioní, ëtit for tatí, ëyou hit me so I hit
backí, ësoí, ëthereforeí etc. are shaped by our spontaneous actions.
While both the causal paradigm and the reason-paradigm are
designed to link things and events together, they are, as we have
already noted, vitally different in so far as the cause and the effect
are mutually external, while the reason and the reasoned are virtually
identical, allowing themselves to be read off from one another.38
This insight that the difference between cause and reason are
enacted in our behaviours should pave the way to appreciate how
actions themselves may be framed in two different ways by the causal
paradigm and the reason-paradigm respectively. Causal paradigm
takes up the stance of describing the actual process or mechanism
through which an action is generated stage by stage, while the
ëreasoní- account is interested in turning this mechanism into a
path, where the process and the result are engulfed in a circular
equivalence39. To give a simple illustration: A shows a colour-sample
to B, defines it as ëredí, and later orders B to paint a red patch.  Bís
action of painting a red patch exactly like the sample will be
amenable to two accounts. The causal account will run somewhat as
follows: I am shown a colour-sample, the word ëredí was pronounced
in such and such a tone, after some time when the order to paint
red was uttered, the image of ëredí came to my mind, (or then I
experienced an adrenaline rush), whenever I experience that I
paint a red patch, etc. A reasoned account of this action will be: ëI
was ordered to paint a red patch according to this colour-sample
and so I adopted the colour and shape exactly similar to the
sample.í40 It is important to note that the causal paradigm puts up
the stance of an extensionalist narration trailing behind the real
process through which the action comes into being, making no effort
to invoke any of its feature as represented or judged by the agent as
showing him a way or a rule for performing the relevant action.
Even the introduction of the mental image leaves out the crucial
factor of the image being judged as corresponding to the word
ëredí given in the ostensive definition as well as in the order, or
being seen to be relevantly similar to the colour of the given sample.
Obviously all the gaps in the mechanismóignorance about some
links, forgetting or mis-describing them, a rectification made by a
third personóare integral to this causal paradigm of describing
actions. On the other hand, since the ëreasoní- account absorbs the
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reason into the action itself in a single circle; there remains no
possibility of an epistemological gap between the agent and the
reason of his action. Further the distinction between the
extensionalist and intensionalist approach to actions is not
constrained by an external ontology of events and its internal
representations; rather the purported externality and internality
are internal to the language-game.
In the light of the above clarification we can handle the
apparently recalcitrant incidence of epistemological gaps between
the agent and the cause of his actions, commonly encountered in
our ordinary uses. Indeed Davidson in order to fortify his causal
theory claimed that on occasions of conflicting motives one may be
wrong about identifying the correct one and thus mis-describe oneís
actions. Thus, when one has two reasons for poisoning his friend
Charlesóeither saving his pain or to get him out of the wayóhe
may err about the real reason.41Mr X who prefers to spend more
time with his beautiful lady-friend than his wife, may describe this
action as an effort of sympathetic counseling, while as a matter of
fact it is the sense of importance and feminine appreciation he gets
from his lady-friend that figures as his actual motivation. Now
Wittgenstein will point out that when we talk about the agentís
missing, mis-representing or mis-describing the real cause behind
his actions, such claims virtually amount to the mis-representation
or mis-description of his entire pattern of wants, intentions and
movements; one cannot have an epistemological gap with the pure
mental antecedents of his actions while retaining the actions
themselves as brute physical effects. When an agent oscillates
between several options as possible causes of his actions, he is actually
oscillating between different actions with different descriptional
identities. Often the purported cases of mis-apprehensions or mis-
descriptions of real intentions are actually cases of missing out the
details, inability to fill up the backdrop of the action with rich
minutiae, or amount to recasting the action by shuffling its
background and foreground etc. Thus, the psycho-analytic
interventions cannot meaningfully claim to haul up the hidden cause
of an action from the sub-conscious, for the simple reason that the
success of analysis is supposed to be shown by the agent agreeing to
the detection, a phenomenon that does not tally with the exercise
of formulating hypothesis, which is an integral part of the causal
account. ë[T]he investigation of reason entails as an essential part
oneís agreement with it, whereas the investigation of a cause is
carried out experimentally.í42 This disposes of Davidsonís theory of
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mental causation of actions in so far as it is seen to involve confusion
between two language-games.
Barring certain obvious restrictions (like an action plainly going
against the agentís report, his claim being insincere etc.) the verbal
explanation of a non-verbal action is an extension or enrichment of
the latter, not a verbal trail of an anteceding event. While one can
readily appreciate that an explanation of a verbal utterance is a way
of paraphrasing it, it is rather challenging to digest the verbal
explanation of a non-verbal action as forging a neat and indissoluble
whole with the latter. Scroeder gives an example: A throwing
snowball on Bís window for two consecutive times in order to get
his attention, where the second act which defines and jells up with
the first act is actually comparable to the verbal explanation of the
first act.43 The question is not one of explaining a language-game
by means of our experience, but of noting a language-game (PI
665). Similarly the psycho-analytic exercise of hauling up hidden
motives from the sub-conscious is virtually to equip oneself (both
the analyst and his patient) with a ëmeans of representingí the action,
shaping up its referential identity as a point of departure.44 This
insight cannot be accommodated in Davidsonís scheme of mental
causation.
This referential identity, as we have already noted, is not an
isolable datum of action to serve as the entry-point into the mesh of
belief, desire and physical movements. And this virtually amounts
to saying that the references of action-words flesh out bit by bit
through each move of the narrative, through each description of
the various facets. This phenomenon of what we call the external
and internal rupture of reference may require further explanation.
We shall follow Wittgensteinís own illustrations of other
expressionsóother parts of speech like nouns, adjectives, etc.óto
extend the same mode of analysis to the action-words. To take a
simple exampleóseen from one standpoint, the simple components
of a chessboard are each of the 64 squares, while from a different
standpoint, its components may said to be colours black and white
and the schema of squares (PI 47). While this external rupture of a
mode of reference is unanimously accepted as the standard reading
of later Wittgenstein, what is not often appreciated is that within
each language-game or each mode of reference-description
interplay the reference does not precede but stretches out bit by
bit through each description. Of course one may ask, shouldnít
each of the 32 black squares and 32 white squares be given as
immaculate units before one can undertake their combination?
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Shouldnít the schema of squares be given as a neat framework before
it can start taking in the colours to fill its empty slots? To address the
second example firstóthe identity of the schema, as to what
constitutes its outer frame, what constitutes its slots, what constitutes
the colour of the frame itself as different from the filling colours,
progressively unfold through each move of filling out the frame.
Similarly what constitutes the boundary-line of each square, what
constitutes the exact extent of its third dimension, only fleshes out
through each cut of its being re-adjusted and re-shaped in the
process of being combined with other squares. If we appreciate this
internal rupture of reference with respect to the linguistic actions
we may readily extend this insight to non-linguistic actions as well.
To say that it is the same basic intention or description (of making
linear movements with oneís legs) that receives alternative
descriptions one needs to be careful that this basic description attains
its basicness only in relation to its being enriched in each of the
alternative modes of configuration or in its thickening out into other
descriptions. The basic description (linear movements of the legs)
can well up to the non-basic descriptions (testing density of earth,
making patterns etc.) only through being absorbed in the whole at
every stage, and not through a passive and linear combination.
Davidson makes the further mistake of straining out a brute
physical eventócommonly shared by and independent of all
descriptions of the action. What seems to be the single physical
event underlying an action of walking can be read as some subtle
atmospheric factors constraining one to move his limbs in such and
such ways, or presence and absence of gravity alternating in
succession to generate the walk-like movement. Or it may well be a
fragment of a much expansive event, viz. concerted operations of
different persons in different positions, related by electric signals,
where each person is receiving remote signals by making matching
movements of the body in a seemingly ambulatory structure. Thus,
what seemed to a neat and independent physical event of leg-
movements is actually an arbitrary bit cut out at random; it does not
even cover a phase of the action of a single participant in the entire
operation. In both these examples the so-called common event
seemingly served on a platter breaks up into numerically distinct
ones having different quantitative boundaries. Each time we seek
to extract a neutral physical event commonly shared by and prior to
all intensional descriptions, this putative exercise of cutting up a
bare physical identity turns out to be a fabricated operation to match
the subsequent descriptions. To put it more explicitly, to demonstrate
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the applicability of Davidsonís theory of extension versus intension
to various actions we strained ourselves to concoct apparently pre-
descriptional or neutral referents like movement of legs in the
forward direction, downward movement of the fingers on the switch,
etc.; while what we actually did was to devise a cyclic enclosure
between reference and description.  The bare physical event and
its embellishments were not genuine progressions from simple to
complex, but were designed in mutual alliance ñ the putatively
bare reference was thickened out into descriptions and the latter
in their turn reverted to their pre-descriptional counterparts.
Following Wittgenstein, we can compare this with the process of
fashioning a white beam of light into a cycle of dispersal and reversal
(of itself and its seven components) through the mechanism of
crossing prisms.45
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Both Wittgenstein and Davidson resist the causal and atomic theories
of reference to come up with an apparently common claim: One
cannot interpret a seemingly uninterrupted noise or physical
movement unless one already enfolds it in a conceptual network.
However, Davidson fails to appreciate the internal rupture of these
networks and doggedly retains an identity that sticks out as a doorway
to these.
Besides in his scheme, though actions themselves are caused
intensionally or conceptually, both first person agency and third
person interpretation of actions is sparked offócausally and non-
conceptuallyóby an external reality, i.e. physical objects and the
bare events or particulars. The main folly of this theory, as pointed
out by McDowell,46 is that the freedom or autonomy generally
attributed to voluntary actions, description or conceptual operations
will lose its senseóour actions and conceptions will virtually turn
into a free spinning wheel rotating in a vacuum. McDowell further
explains that this theory labours under an unhealthy dichotomyó
that between sensibility and concepts, nature and norms. Sensing
or being acted upon by the world falls within the realm of a primal
nature, while concepts have a sui generis or spontaneous character
that falls outside. The capacity to move our arms falls within the
realm of our receptive nature, and the sui generis spontaneity involved
in the intention to move the arm carves out an exclusive realm for
itself. Rephrased in Kantian terms, this theory commits the blunder
of not realizing that intentions without overt activity are empty, and
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the mere movements of limbs without concepts are blind
happenings, not expressions of agency. McDowell holds that
Wittgenstein finds out an ingenious route out of this dichotomyó
by showing how the way our nature (sensibility) embeds reason or
concepts itself becomes our second nature, although these natural
conceptual exercises cannot be formulated in terms of laws. At the
same time in our conceptual operations we do not have to step out
of our natural kind and become non-natural. Whether McDowellís
account constitutes the best reading of Wittgenstein in terms of
doing justice to the radical extent of his anti-foundationalism is a
matter that goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
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